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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 336 
Accident time: 12:04 Accident Date: 03/04/2000 
Where it occurred: Mahala Babaji Village, 
Engeel District, Herat 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 14/08/2000 
ID original source: No: MI 02/2000 Name of source: IGM 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: M-19 AT blast Ground condition: agricultural 
(abandoned) 
soft 
Date record created: 20/02/2004 Date  last modified: 20/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Task 20-2002-037-125 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
use of pick (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
dog missed mine (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
1 
Accident report 
Access to the accident data was denied by the MAC programme manager. A brief summary 
of the accident was provided by a professional researcher who had access to the original 
documents.  That summary is reconstructed here. 
[Map references are not recorded in the MAC records, so the minefield task number (when 
available) is entered in the Map Ref field at the Incident/Accident tab as an identifying 
feature.] 
Victim No.1 had worked in demining for three years. Victim No.2 had worked in demining for 
20 months. Their last revision course had been in December 1999. Their last leave had been 
seven days before the accident. The area had been surveyed in December 1996. The ground 
in the area was recorded as “agricultural, soft”. The mines found has been “mostly” M19 AT 
mines. 
The site had been cleared by EDDs starting in March 1997 but a clearance certificate had not 
been issued. A missed Mine accident occurred in June 1999 (when a farmer riding a donkey 
initiated a mine). As a result, part of area had been resurveyed and a new area also 
surveyed.  
On the day of the accident the Group leader was sick so the Assistant group leader was in 
charge.  
The site of the accident was indicated by two dogs and the two victims moved forward to 
investigate. Victim No.1 began to excavate at the site with his pick. After some time he 
changed with Victim No.2.  Without waiting for Victim No.1 to withdraw, Victim No.2 set to 
work with the pick and “immediately” initiated an M19 mine.  
Victim No.1 was only a few meters away when the mine detonated. Victim No.2 was killed 
instantly by being “blown apart”. Victim No.2 received concussion to the back and minor leg 
wounds. He died from “internal injuries” 15 minutes after the explosion while on the way to 
hospital. 
The bodies were evacuated by UN flight to Jalalabad to be returned to their families. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators found that the use of the pick appears to have been inappropriate, in 
relation to both force used and angle of use. They found that work to investigate the dogs’ 
indication may have been rushed because it was “probably” the last indication to be done for 
the day. They noted that Victim No.2 should have waited until his partner was a greater 
distance away before beginning work, and found that “poor command and control” appeared 
to have occurred.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 422 Name: Name removed 
Age: 35 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Body 
2 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
Victim was "blown apart". 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 423 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
minor Legs 
COMMENT 
Victim died from unspecified internal injuries 15 minutes later. No medical report was made 
available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because Victim 
No.2 was in breach of SOPs by not waiting for partner to withdraw before starting work. It 
seems likely that he also used his “pick” carelessly. These errors were not corrected. 
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because group management allowed 
clearance to go on without appropriately qualified supervisors at the site. The provision of a 
pick for AT mine clearance may also have been inappropriate. (Search on “use of pick” in this 
database to see how many accidents occur when using a pick or hoe to excavate.) 
The evidence of dogs having missed mines stems from the fact that the area was cleared by 
dogs previously. The mine in this accident (and the previous civilian accident) had been 
missed. 
The failure to complete an accident report until 4 and a half months after the accident is not 
uncommon in this theatre and implies a carelessness about the need to learn from accidents 
quickly. No criticism of the NGO charged with carrying out accident investigations for the UN 
MAC is intended. The NGO is frequently not provided with the means to carry out 
investigations in a timely manner. 
The failure of the MAC to allow access to accident reports means that the report made here is 
acknowledged to be unsatisfactory. It will be revised if access is ever allowed. The failure of 
the MACC to act with transparency is bound to raise questions over what they have to hide.  
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